The behavioral révolution in geography and the subséquent humanist reaction precipitated debate about observer objectivity. This paper attempts to construct a positivist model of subject-object interaction which also encompasses humanistic méthodologies.
This model assumes that both an observer and the object of observation can be completely described in terms of matter and energy behaving in accordance with the laws of physics. Because the laws of physics, as well as the concepts of matter and energy, hâve been formulated via the application of the scientific method, this model is positivist.
In this model, the subject is viewed as an open, dynamic System of matter and energy having roughiy definable boundaries in time and space. Specifically, the subject System is the physical body of the observer. It is enclosed by a boundary whose shape and position changes constantly as the observer moves around. This System continually reacts to energy which continually impinges upon it, the reaction to energy contacting the boundaries of the sensé organs being of greatest importance. Only a small fraction of this reaction manifests itself in the macroscopic movement of the organism. Most of the reaction consists of the perpétuai rearrangement of electrical and chemical patterns in the brain.
The object under observation is also viewed as an open, dynamic System of matter and energy roughiy bounded in time and space. Part of this boundary must coincide with the boundary of the observer. Along this common boundary there is a constant exchange of energy. A room full of people is an example of an object System. A person interviewing thèse people is the subject System. The surface of that person's body is the boundary separating subject System from object System. The energy entering the subject system from the object System is the observer's sensory input. The position coordinates of the common boundary vary continuously through time (because the observer's body -and sensé organs -move continuously through space), as does the strength of the mechanical, electro-magnetic, and chemical energy impinging on each point of the common boundary. This energy contains ail the information the observer can obtain about the object system; the distribution and intensity of the energy contacting the boundary of the subject system is the raw data about the object system which the observer then processes. Thus the concept of energy interaction is cardinal to this conceptual framework.
The sensory input affects electrical and chemical patterns of the organism's nervous system immediately upon contacting the sensé organs. The manner in which the sensory input affects thèse patterns dépends upon the energy contacting the sensé organ in question, the energy contacting ail the other sensé organs at the time of contact, patterns formed in the immédiate past (short term memory), patterns formed in the distant past (long term memory) (Ittelson, 1973, pp. 9-12) , and the initial, genetically determined structure of the nervous system. Thus the raw data begins to be processed immediately upon contact with the sensé organs.
Immediately after contact there is a direct, but not completely direct, correspondent between the type and strength of energy contacting a sensé organ and the résultant electrical and chemical pattern in the nervous system. As time passes, this correspondence becomes less direct as the pattern becomes increasingly modified by the other patterns previously mentioned. Eventually what remains is a highly interprétée!, symbolic représentation of the original sensory input.
At the same time that energy is entering the subject-system from the objectsystem, the subject-system is imparting energy to the object-system, and thus affects the energy the object-system introduces back into the subject-system at a later time. An observer who is asking someone questions is imparting energy back to the objectsystem which, in this case, is the person being interviewed. The responses by this person, in turn, impart energy back to the subject-system. Finally, both the objectsystem and the subject-system exchange energy with the environment (Figure 1 ).
It should be noted that the absence of complète séparation between subject and object which this energy interaction implies is not a corollary of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle in physics. Because of the microscopic size of the object-system and the wave properties of matter, the act of measurement itself necessarily significantly affects a sub-atomic system. Thus, for example :
where A x is the uncertainty in position along the x-axis and A P x is the uncertainty in simultaneously measured momentum along the same axis. In the social sciences, however, this effect is negligible. Hère the energy transferred between subject-system and object-system is macroscopic and consists of such things as the exchange of questions and answers in an unstructured interview. Réduction of energy transfers from subject-system to object-system is thus a practical problem whose solution is not constrained by a theoretical limit.
The goal of the investigator is to understand the behavior of the object-system. To do this, he (she) classifies the myriad of immédiate perceptions of the object-system into broad catégories. Thèse are the variables of the object-system and are typically 
where v : is the i th of a total of n variables. This is because the variables we construct are related to each other via the laws of the physical sciences.
The entire System can be represented as the sum of ail the variables and ail the interactions between the variables: n n S = Sv + II: , j l U' J where S represents the total object-system, and \ t • is the interaction between the i th and j th variables.
Because of the absence of a direct correspondence between sensory input and the résultant electrical and chemical patterns in the subject organism, and because of the interaction between the subject and object Systems, the définition of variables and their subséquent analysis is partially arbitrary and subjective. However, because the resuit of a successful analysis allows the observer to predict the immédiate perceptions of a large number of people in a wide variety of situations, there is also an objective component.
There are a large number of patterns which may be created from the objectsystem variables. For example, figure 2 demonstrates two ways of patterning a séries of dots. Both of thèse ways generalize a large amount of information into a small number of rules or regularities. Each method may be successfully applied to other similar phenomena, though one may be more efficient or useful than the other. Thus, which of thèse patterns is chosen dépends upon the subjectivity of the investigator.
By contrast, many patterns simply cannot be made to fit. The rejection of thèse patterns is the objective part of the analysis. This is represented in a Venn diagram in figure 3 .
Ail méthodologies may be viewed as attempting to create a model of the objectsystem by arranging the object-system variables in meaningful patterns. To do this, relationships between the variables are determined. One of the prevailing méthodo-logies is positivism. It is a philosophical stance. It is founded on empirical reality and validity, and contends that genuine knowledge must be perceptible in time and space. Statements are only considered meaningful if they are analytically true or can be tangibly verified by the sensés. Positivists hold that subject and object are separated. Hypothèses are established and tested. This is done by attempting to hold ail the object-variables constant except the two under considération. One of the two is made to vary, and the behavior of the other is observed. Eventually laws are deduced.
The above procédure is much easier to perform in the natural sciences than in the social sciences. In the social sciences there are a large number of possible variables and patterns which are consistent with the data. It is difficult to keep many of the variables constant, and each variable has significant interaction with a large number of other variables. Finally, the interaction between subject-system and object-system is often quite considérable. Thèse difficulties explain the numerous social science approaches, models, and méthodologies. The underlying philosophies of many of thèse approaches are inconsistent with the previous discussion; however, ail the various techniques and méthodologies can be accomodated within this theoretical framework.
For example, the philosophy behind a phenomenological approach is radically différent from that presented in this paper. Phenomenologists, in fact, deny any séparation between the observer and the world of the thing studied (Seamon, p. 3) and thus the philosophy of phenomenology is irreconcilably opposed to the positivist philosophy on which our model is based. Yet phenomenological techniques can be viewed as variations of the pattern-forming process previously described.
Phenomenology is concerned with the subject's immersion in his (her) world of study. The method involves such processes as phenomenological intuiting (an attempt is made hère for the subject to meet the phenomenon in an unprejudiced way as possible) and phenomenological disclosure, where the subject believes that his (her) seing of the thing is correct (Seamon, 1983) . Although phenomenologists deny séparation of subject and world studied, a reciprocal relationship is still implied. Phenomenologists argue that much behavior is habituai, and has a certain regularity. Habituai behavior takes place on many environmental scales. The concept of bodysubject is involved which may be described as the inhérent capacity of the body to direct the person intelligently (Seamon 1979) .
Phenomenological methodology can be accommodated within the constraints of our framework. Phenomenologists organize sensory inputs into patterns. The process of phenomenological intuition is an attempt to recreate patterns which existed before a large amount of interprétation had operated on the sensory data. This is done by attempting to strip away preconceived ideas and préjudices which had played a rôle in the interpretive process.
But this process is itself subjective and interpretive. Some preconceptions are removed while others are retained; other préjudices are buried unaware in the investigator's subconscious. Thus the patterns existing in the investigator's mind at the moment of disclosure are similar, but not identical, to patterns which existed shortly after the sensory data was encountered. One of the great advantages of the phenomenological method, in fact, is its ability to recreate patterns which resemble those which are routinely buried in the subconscious.
We conclude that our theoretical framework accommodâtes both positivist and phenomenological modes of inquiry. We concède there are radical différences in thèse méthodologies, and are not advocating their union. We simply affirm that both are encompassed in our positivist model, and that one need not accept phenomenological philosophy in order to use phenomenological methodology.
